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8.1  Introduction 
The spread of managed care presents important challenges to teaching 
hospitals. Perhaps most importantly, the downward pressures on health 
care prices associated with the spread of managed care are forcing teach- 
ing hospitals to attempt to decrease their own costs. Yet the traditional in- 
dependence of academic physicians and the rapid turnover of housestaff 
in teaching hospitals make many of the methods used by managed care to 
control costs-such  as provider capitation, utilization review,  and active 
management of care using critical pathways and other algorithms-espe- 
cially difficult for teaching hospitals to implement. 
The need to make these major changes in the operation  of  teaching 
hospitals comes at a time when changing physician workforce needs pres- 
ent a new set of educational challenges for teaching hospitals. Widespread 
belief that there is a growing surplus of physicians has led to national calls 
to decrease the number of  physicians in training. Because of this belief 
that the numbers of physicians in training should be reduced, and because 
of the developing challenges to the solvency of the Medicare trust fund, 
the traditional revenue that academic medical centers have received from 
the federal government for graduate medical education is clearly in jeop- 
ardy. Moreover, at the same time, a growing demand  for primary care 
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physicians, also driven by  managed care, is forcing teaching hospitals to 
move housestaff from specialty and inpatient-oriented training to ambu- 
latory and generalist training. Within residency programs in internal med- 
icine,  this  is  exemplified by  the  new  Residency Review  Commission 
requirement that at least 30 percent of training time being spent in the 
ambulatory setting (ACGME 1997). 
With all of these challenges facing teaching hospitals, there are serious 
concerns about their ability to maintain their academic mission and fi- 
nancial viability. While prominent medical journals have devoted a great 
deal of  attention to speculation concerning how teaching hospitals will 
and should meet these challenges related to the spread of managed care, 
there is surprisingly little empirical evidence about the effects of managed 
care on academic medical centers. In this paper we examine the experience 
of one large academic medical center and its relationship to a single large 
managed care organization. Although the institution in question repre- 
sents, of course, only one institution, it is interesting to examine in some 
detail the role that managed care has come to play in that institution. 
Section 8.2 describes the institutional context for this study, focusing on 
the different incentives of the traditional and managed medical services in 
the hospital. Section 8.3 provides some summary statistics that describe 
the populations in these two services, including data on the mix of patients 
by  diagnosis and severity of  illness. This provides preliminary data on 
costs and some insight into the ways in which a managed care service can 
affect the educational experience provided by  the teaching hospital. Sec- 
tion 8.4 examines costs on the traditional and managed care services, in- 
cluding both differences in costs and causes of those differences. Although 
the ability to measure severity of illness with these data is limited, the 
results suggest that the managed care services do indeed have substantially 
lower  costs than the traditional  services, and that the lower costs are 
largely attributable to a decrease in length of stay. Section 8.5 examines 
this difference in length of stay within the context of house officer work- 
load and summarizes results we have reported elsewhere concerning how 
differences in workload on the traditional and managed care services can 
affect length of stay and costs (Meltzer, Hiltz, and Bates 1997). A formal 
model of attending physician incentives and behavior that provides a po- 
tential mechanism for understanding these results is then presented in sec- 
tion 8.6. In focusing on the behavior of physicians as agents functioning 
within an incentive system structured by the hospital, the analysis is most 
similar in spirit to the work of Harris (1977) on the internal organization 
of hospitals. However, in emphasizing nonpecuniary incentives for physi- 
cians, and in suggesting that hospital production is inefficient, it has im- 
portant connections to the broader literature on not-for-profit hospitals 
(i.e., Newhouse 1970, and Pauly and Redisch 1973). Section 8.7 concludes. Implications of Managed Care for Teaching Hospitals  251 
8.2  Institutional Context 
The hospital we  examine is one of the primary teaching hospitals of a 
major academic medical center (AMC). The managed care organization 
(MCO) is a local managed care organization with several hundred thou- 
sand covered lives. The two organizations have been closely linked since 
the establishment of the MCO approximately 30 years ago, with all of the 
faculty of the MCO holding faculty appointments at the academic medi- 
cal center associated with the hospital. Nevertheless, until the 1980s, the 
MCO ran its own independent hospital. At that time, the MCO decided 
that it could decrease costs by  closing its own hospital and contracting 
with the teaching hospital to provide inpatient care for its patients, with 
the physicians of the MCO maintaining primary control of those patients 
admitted to the hospital. The terms of this arrangement have varied over 
time. However, throughout the period covered by  the data in this study 
(March 1994 to August 1995), the MCO compensated the hospital purely 
on a per diem rate independent of diagnosis or costs. 
This study examines the 14,878 admissions to the internal medicine ser- 
vices during this period. Care on these services is divided among six ser- 
vices that constitute general internal medicine and subspecialty internal 
medicine care in the hospital (table 8.1). Physician staffing on these ser- 
vices generally follows a common pattern. Each service is divided into 
two teams, each of which is staffed by two interns, one resident, and one 
attending physician. On each service, each intern is on call every fourth 
night, so that one of the four interns from the two teams that constitute a 
service is on call every night. The on-call intern both admits new patients 
and provides “cross cover” for emergencies that arise among the patients 
usually cared for by  the other three interns on the service. The residents 
across several services use a pooling arrangement so that the interns have 
supervision and assistance even when the usual resident from their team 
is not in the hospital. 
Table 8.1  Medicine Services 
No. of Patients 
Service  Description  during Study Period 
Teams 112  Traditional general medicine service  2,519 
Teams 3/4  Traditional hematology/oncology service  2,086 
Teams 5/6  Managed care medicine service  2,472 
Teams 7/8  Mixed traditional and managed care service  2,460 
Teams 9/10  Traditional medicine service  2,455 
Cards BllB2  Traditional cardiology service  2,886 
Total  14,878 252  David Meltzer, Frederick L. Hdtz, and David Bates 
Table 8.2  Distribution of Patients by  Payer among Medicine Services 
Service  Medicare  Other  Managed Care  Total 
Teams 112  1,245  1,194  80  2,519 
Teams 314  1,148  572  366  2,086 
Teams 516  80  179  2,2 13  2,472 
Teams 718  596  613  1,251  2,460 
Teams 9/10  1,105  1,208  142  2,455 
Cards BllB2  1,338  1,541  7  2,886 
Total  5,512  5,307  4,059  14,878 
This basic model holds on all six services. However, the services also 
have important differences. Teams 1/2 and 9/10 are traditional general 
medicine services. As seen in table 8.2, a large portion of patients on these 
services are Medicare patients. The “other” category is diverse, including 
a mixture of patients with traditional indemnity insurance, insurance from 
smaller managed care plans, Medicaid, or no insurance. As in most teach- 
ing hospitals, care on the traditional services is supervised by  academic 
medicine attendings employed by  the teaching hospital. This is true on 
both the general medicine and specialty services. On those teams, the at- 
tending is responsible both for patient care and for teaching the housestaff 
and medical students. The majority of managed care patients are on teams 
516. On those teams, teaching is provided by  an attending employed by 
the managed care service who has no direct patient care responsibilities, 
while management of the patients remains under the control of attendings 
from the individual health centers of the managed care organization. A 
smaller number of managed care patients are cared for on the other ser- 
vices (especially teams 7/8, which later became a managed care service run 
along the model of teams 5/6). On these teams, patient care decisions for 
the managed care patients are made by the managed care attendings, while 
traditional attendings perform the majority of teaching. 
There are important differences in the incentives of housestaff and at- 
tendings on the two services. While the analysis that follows will focus on 
financial incentives to minimize resource utilization, it should be noted 
that both attendings and housestaff have strong incentives to provide high- 
quality care. All are informally but closely evaluated by their peers for the 
quality of care they provide, and both the AMC and MCO have reputa- 
tions for patient care of extremely high quality that they do not want to 
jeopardize. On the traditional services, the evaluation of housestaff is more 
formal, with a written evaluation prepared by the attending physician at 
the end of each month. While these evaluations generally will not have a 
large effect on a house officer, the opinions of  attendings concerning a 
house officer may have important effects on their ability to obtain a desir- 
able fellowship position or job following residency. Perhaps because pa- Implications of Managed Care for Teaching Hospitals  253 
tient care on the managed care service is divided among the attendings 
from the different health centers, evaluation on that service comes only 
from the teaching attending, who has relatively little opportunity to ob- 
serve the house officer in direct patient care. Financial incentives play no 
significant role in determining the quality of care provided by  the hous- 
estaff. They are paid a fixed salary for their work and are responsible for 
caring for all the patients who come onto their service on the days they 
admit until either the patients are discharged or the end of the month, at 
which time the house officer switches services and the care of the patient 
is passed on to the next house officer on the service.' 
Attendings on both the traditional and managed care services also have 
important reputational concerns, but they may also face financial incen- 
tives to decrease resource utilization. Certainly this is true for their em- 
ployers; the teaching hospital is paid a prospective rate per hospitalization 
for the majority of its patients (mostly by Medicare under the Prospective 
Payment System), and the MCO pays the teaching hospital a per diem 
rate. Thus, both organizations have strong incentives to accelerate the dis- 
charge of patients, while the teaching hospital may also have an incentive 
to decrease the total cost of hospitalization by decreasing other costs such 
as radiology, pharmacy, and so forth. The MCO may, in fact, have oppo- 
site incentives concerning some radiological procedures. If a patient re- 
quires a procedure that could be done on an inpatient or outpatient basis, 
the MCO may prefer to have it done as an inpatient when it will be in- 
cluded in the per diem, as long as it does not result in an increased length 
of stay. 
While both the teaching hospital and MCO may wish to decrease length 
of stay, the attendings on the two services face very different incentives. On 
the traditional services, the incentives of attendings to decrease resource 
utilization are weak. Attendings are given no financial incentives to dis- 
charge patients sooner, and during the time period examined in this study, 
they did not even receive regular feedback concerning their length of stay 
or costs compared to those of other attendings. In contrast, on the man- 
aged care service services, the physicians from the individual health cen- 
ters who are responsible for direct patient management receive direct feed- 
back  concerning length of  stay.  Moreover,  their  centers are partially 
compensated by the MCO based on their ability to control length of stay 
and costs. Therefore, as members of relatively small centers, the earnings 
of both the attendings and their colleagues are related to the resource 
utilization of the patients they have cared for. This can generate strong 
incentives for accelerated discharge on the managed care service. To rein- 
1. The possibility of shirking work by  leaving patients for the next house officer does not 
seem to be important in practice. In fact, there is extra work involved in signing out a patient 
to the incoming house officer and a strong set of social pressures not to sign out an unneces- 
sarily large service to a colleague. 254  David Meltzer, Frederick L. Hiltz, and David Bates 
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Table 8.3  Characteristics of Traditional and Managed Care Patients 
Traditional  Managed Care  Total 
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force these efforts to accelerate discharge, patients on the managed care 
service are assigned nurse managers who assist with efforts to muster the 
inpatient and outpatient resources required for discharge. 
8.3  Patient Characteristics 
Table 8.3  provides summary statistics for the differences in demographic 
characteristics, severity of illness, health outcomes, and costs between the 
traditional and managed care services. Patients on the managed care ser- 
vice are younger and more likely to be male. They are also less ill as mea- 
sured by  diagnosis-related group (DRG) weight. All of these differences 
are statistically significant (p  < 0.0001). Although the managed care ser- 
vice has a lower crude mortality rate, this difference is not statistically 
significant even at p < 0.1.2  Length of stay on the managed care service 
is substantially shorter than on the traditional service (4.54 versus 6.54 
days), and charges per admission are approximately $5,000 lower ($10,824 
versus $15,98 l), with these differences both significantly different from 
zero at p < 0.0001. The substantially shorter length of stay on managed 
care services may have negative effects on housestaff education, since eval- 
uations for acute conditions are often completed on an outpatient basis. 
For example, a patient admitted with chest pain may be discharged prior 
to an exercise tolerance test so that the decision making that follows that 
test is now passed back to the referring physician and is not part of the 
educational experience of the housestaff. 
One factor that may also affect the way the presence of  the managed 
care organization influences the educational experience provided by  the 
teaching hospital is  the distribution of  diagnoses among the patients. 
Table 8.4  describes this for the traditional and managed care service. De- 
spite the breadth of these categories, it is interesting to note that many 
2.  It is also not statistically significant in a multivariate logistic regression that controls for 
patient age, sex, race, and DRG weight. Table 8.4  Distribution of Diagnoses on Traditional and Managed Care Services 
Diagnosis-Related Group Name  Traditional  Managed Care  Total 
Acute & subacute endocarditis 
Abortion wl D&C, aspiration curettage, or 
Acute adjustment reaction & disturbances 
Acute leukemia wlo major O.R. procedure 
Acute major eye infections 
Admit for renal dialysis 
Adrenal & pituitary procedures 
Aftercare wlo history of malignancy as 
Aftercare, musculoskeletal system & 
Alcoholldrug abuse or dependency, 
hysterotomy 




detoxification or other symptoms treated 
w/ cc 
detoxification or other symptoms treated 
wlo cc 
Alcoholldrug abuse or dependence, left 
against medical advice 
Allergic reactions age >17 
Amputation of lower limb for endocrine, 
nutritional, and metabolic disorders 
Amputation for circulatory system 
disorders except upper limb &toe 
Anal & stomal procedures wl cc 
Anal & stomal procedures wlo cc 
Angina pectoris 
Appendectomy w/ complicated principal 
diagnosis wl cc 
Arthroscopy 
Atherosclerosis w/ cc 
Atherosclerosis wlo cc 
Back & neck procedures wl cc 
Back & neck procedures wlo cc 
Benign prostatic hypertrophy w/ cc 
Bilateral or multiple major joint procedures 
Biliary tract procedure except only 
Alcoholldrugabuseordependency, 
of lower extremity 
cholecystectomy wl or wlo common duct 
exploration w/ cc 
connective tissue 
WI  cc 
WIO cc 
Biopsies of musculoskeletal system & 
Bone diseases & specific arthropathies 


















































































(continued) Table 8.4  (continued) 
Diagnosis-Related Group Name  Traditional  Managed Care  Total 
Bone marrow transplant 
Breast biopsy & local excision for non- 
Bronchitis & asthma age >17 w/ cc 
Bronchitis & asthma age >17 w/o cc 
Cardiac arrhythmia & conduction disorders 
Cardiac arrhythmia & conduction disorders 
Cardiac congenital & valvular disorders age 
Cardiac congenital & valvular disorders age 
Cardiac pacemaker device replacement 
Cardiac pacemaker revision except device 
Cardiac valve procedures wl cardiac cath 
Cardiac valve procedures w/o cardiac cath 
Cellulitis age >  17 w/ cc 
Cellulitis age >17 w/o cc 
Cellulitis age 0-17 
Cesarean section w/ cc 
Chemotherapy wlacute leukemia as 
secondary diagnosis 
Chemotherapy w/o acute leukemia as 
secondary diagnosis 
Chest pain 
Cholecystectomy except by laparoscope 
w/o common duct exploration w/  cc 
Cholecystectomy except by laparoscope 
w/o common duct exploration w/o cc 
Cholecystectomy w/common duct 
exploration w/ cc 
Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease 
Circulatory disorders except acute 
myocardial infarction, w/  cardiac 
catheterization & complex diagnosis 
myocardial infarction, w/ cardiac 
catheterization wlo complex diagnosis 
Circulatory disorders w/ acute myocardial 
infarction & cardiovascular comp disch 
alive 
Circulatory disorders w/ acute myocardial 






>17 w/ cc 
>17 w/o cc 
replacement 
Circulatory disorders except acute 




















































































14 Table 8.4  (continued) 
Diagnosis-Related  Group Name  Traditional  Managed Care  Total 
Cirrhosis & alcoholic hepatitis 
Coagulation disorders 
Complicated peptic ulcer 
Complications of treatment wl cc 
Complications of treatment wlo cc 
Concussion age >  17 wl cc 
Connective tissue disorders w/  cc 
Connective tissue disorders w/o cc 
Coronary bypass w/  cardiac catheterization 
Coronary bypass wlo cardiac 
Cranial & peripheral nerve disorders wl cc 
Cranial & peripheral nerve disorders wlo cc 
Craniotomy age >I7 except for trauma 
Craniotomy for trauma age >  17 
D&C, conization & radio-implant,  for 
D&C, conization except for malignancy 
Deep vein thrombophlebitis 
Degenerative nervous sytem disorders 
Dental & oral disorders except 
extractions & restorations, age >I7 
Dental extractions & restorations 
Diabetes age >35 
Diabetes age 0-35 
Digestive malignancy wl cc 
Digestive malignancy w/o cc 
Disequilibrium 
Disorders of liver except malignancy; 
cirrhosis, alcoholic hepatitis wl cc 
Disorders of liver except malignancy, 
cirrhosis, alcoholic hepatitis w/o cc 
Disorders of pancreas except malignancy 
Disorders of personality & impulse control 
Disorders of the biliary tract w/  cc 
Disorders of the biliary tract w/o cc 
Ear, nose, mouth, & throat malignancy 
Endocrine disorders wl  cc 
Endocrine disorders wlo cc 
Epiglottitis 
Epistaxis 
Esophagitis, gastroenteritis, & misc. 
digestive disorders age >I7 w/  cc 
Esophagitis, gastroenteritis, & misc. 
digestive disorders age >  17 w/o cc 
Esophagitis, gastroenteritis, & misc. 
























































































































1 Table 8.4  (continued) 
Diagnosis-Related Group Name  Traditional  Managed Care  Total 
Extensive O.R. procedure unrelated to 
Extracranial vascular procedures 
Fever of unknown origin age >17 wl cc 
Fever of unknown origin age >  17 wlo cc 
Fractures of hip & pelvis 
Fracture, sprain, strain, & dislocation of 
forearm, hand, foot age >  17 wl cc 
Fracture, sprain, strain, & dislocation of 
forearm, hand, foot age >  17 wlo cc 
Fracture, sprain, strain, & dislocation of 
upper arm, lower leg except foot age >  17 
wl cc 
principal diagnosis 
Gastrointestinal hemorrhage w/ cc 
Gastrointestinal hemorrhage wlo cc 
Gastrointestinal obstruction wl cc 
Gastrointestinal obstruction wlo cc 
Hand procedures for injuries 
Heart failure & shock 
Heart transplant 
Hepatobiliary diagnostic procedure for 
malignancy 
Hepatobiliary diagnostic procedure for 
non-malignancy 
Hernia procedures except inguinal & 
femoral age >  17 wl cc 
Hip & femur procedures except major joint 
age>17wlcc 
Hip & femur procedures except major joint 
age >  17 wlo cc 
HIV w/ extensive O.R. procedure 
HIV wl major related condition 
HIV wlor wlo other related condition 
Hypertension 
Inborn errors of metabolism 
Infections, female reproductive system 
Inflammation of the male reproductive 
Inflammatory bowel disease 
Inguinal & femoral hernia procedures age 
Interstitial lung disease wl cc 
Interstitial lung disease wlo cc 
Intraocular procedures except retina, iris, 
Kidney & urinary tract infections age >  17 
system 





































































































183 Table 8.4  (continued) 
~  ~~  ~~ 
Diagnosis-Related Group Name  Traditional  Managed Care  Total 
Kidney & urinary tract infections age >  17 
Kidney & urinary tract infections age 0-17 
Kidney & urinary tract neoplasms wl cc 
Kidney & urinary tract signs & symptoms 
Kidney & urinary tract signs & symptoms 
Kidney, ureter, & major bladder procedure 
Kidney, ureter, & major bladder procedures 
Knee procedures wl cc 
Laparoscopic cholecystectomy wlo 
common duct exploration w/ cc 
Laparoscopic cholecystectomy wlo 
common duct exploration wlo cc 
Lens procedures with or without 
vitrectomy 
Local excision & removal of internal fixed 
devices except hip & femur 
Local excision & removal of internal fixed 
devices of hip & femur 
Lower extremity & humerus procedure 
except hip, foot, femur age >  17 wl cc 
Lymphoma & leukemia wl major O.R. 
procedure 
Lymphoma & non-acute leukemia wl cc 
Lymphoma & non-acute leukemia w/ other 
Lymphoma & non-acute leukemia w/ other 
Lymphoma & non-acute leukemia wlo cc 
Major cardiovascular procedures wl cc 
Major cardiovascular procedures wlo cc 
Major chest procedures 
Major joint & limb reattachment 
procedures of lower extremity 
Major joint & limb reattachment 
procedures of upper extremity 
Major shoulderlelbow procedure, or other 
upper extremity procedure wl cc 
Major skin disorders wl cc 
Major skin disorders wlo cc 
Major small & large bowel procedures 
Major small & large bowel procedures 
wlo cc 
age >17 wl cc 
age 11  7 wlo cc 
for non-neoplasm wl cc 
for neoplasm 
O.R. procedure wl cc 


























































































(continued) Table 8.4  (continued) 
~~ 
Diagnosis-Related Group Name  Traditional  Managed Care  Total 
Malignancy of hepatobiliary system or 
Malignancy, female reproductive system 
Malignancy, female reproductive system 
Medical back problems 
Menstrual & other female reproductive 
Minor bladder procedures w/ cc 
Minor skin disorders w/ cc 
Minor skin disorders w/o cc 
Miscellaneous ear, nose, mouth, & throat 
Mouth procedures w/o cc 
Multiple sclerosis & cerebellar ataxia 






differentiated neoplasms w/ major O.R. 
procedures w/ cc 
differentiated neoplasms w/ other O.R. 
procedures 
meningitis 
Myeloproliferative disorders or poorly 
Nervous system infection except viral 
Nervous system neoplasms w/ cc 
Nervous system neoplasms w/o cc 
Neurological eye disorders 
Neuroses except depressive 
Non-extensive burns w/  skin graft 
Non-extensive O.R. procedure unrelated to 
Non-specific arthropathies 
Nonspecific cerebrovascular disorders w/ cc 
Nonspecific cerebrovascular disorders 
Nontraumatic stupor & coma 
Nutritional & misc. metabolic disorders age 
Nutritional & misc. metabolic disorders age 
O.R. procedure w/ diagnoses of other 
O.R. procedure for infectious & parasitic 
Orbital procedures 




>17  w/ cc 
>17  wlo cc 






























































































15 Table 8.4  (continued) 
Diagnosis-Related  Group Name  Traditional  Managed Care  Total 
Other permanent cardiac pacemaker 
implant or automatic implantable 




Other antepartum diagnoses wl medical 
Other antepartum diagnoses w/o medical 
Other cardiothoracic procedures 
Other circulatory system diagnoses w/  cc 
Other circulatory system diagnoses wlo cc 
Other circulatory system O.R. procedures 
Other digestive system diagnoses age >  17 
Other digestive system diagnoses age >17 
Other digestive system O.R. procedures 
Other digestive system O.R. procedures 
Other disorders of nervous system w/  cc 
Other disorders of nervous system wlo cc 
Other disorders of the eye age >17 w/  cc 
Other disorders of the eye age >  17 wlo cc 
Other ear, nose, mouth, & throat diagnoses 
Other ear, nose, mouth, & throat diagnoses 
Other ear, nose, mouth, & throat O.R. 
Other endocrine, nutritional, & metabolic 
Other endocrine, nutritional, & metabolic 
Other factors influencing health status 
Other hepatobiliary or pancreas O.R. 
Other infectious & parasitic diseases 
Other injury, poisoning, & toxic effect 
Other injury, poisoning, & toxic effect 
Other kidney & urinary tract diagnoses age 








O.R. procedure wl  cc 
O.R. procedure wlo cc 
procedures 
diagnoses 
diagnoses wl cc 
diagnoses wlo cc 
>17 wl cc 
procedures 






































14  62 
4  5 






6  15 
0  1 
0  2 





0  4 
4  32 
1  3 
0  4 
7  71 
19  5 
(continued) Table 8.4  (continued) 
Diagnosis-Related Group Name  Traditional  Managed Care  Total 
Other kidney & urinary tract O.R. 
Other male reproductive system diagnoses 
Other male reproductive system O.R. 
procedures except for malignancy 
Other multiple significant trauma 
Other musculoskeletal system & connective 
tissue O.R. procedure wl cc 
Other musculoskeletal system & connective 
tissue O.R. procedure procedure wlo cc 
Other musculoskeletal system & connective 
tissue diagnoses 
Other myeloproliferative  disorder or poorly 
differentiated neoplasm diagnosis wl  cc 
Other myeloproliferative  disorder or poorly 
differentiated neoplasm diagnosis wlo cc 
Other O.R. procedures for injuries wl cc 
Other O.R. procedures of the blood and 
Other respiratory system O.R. procedures 
Other respiratory system O.R. procedures 
Other respiratory system diagnoses w/ cc 
Other respiratory system diagnoses w/o cc 
Other skin, subcutaneous tissue, &breast 
Other skin, subcutaneous tissue, & breast 
Other vascular procedures wl cc 
Other vascular procedures wlo cc 
Otitis media & upper respiratory tract 
Otitis media & upper respiratory tract 
Pancreas, liver, & shunt procedures wl  cc 
Pancreas, liver, & shunt procedures w/o cc 
Pathological fractures & musculoskeletal & 
Percutaneous cardiovascular procedures 
Peripheral & cranial nerve & other nervous 
Peripheral & cranial nerve & other nervous 
Peripheral vascular disorders wl cc 
Peripheral vascular disorders wlo cc 
Peritoneal adhesiolysis wl cc 
procedures 
blood forming organs 
wl cc 
WIO cc 
procedures wl cc 
procedures wlo cc 
infection age >  17 wl  cc 
infection age >17 wlo cc 
connective tissue malignancy 
system procedures wl cc 


























































































2 Table 8.4  (continued) 
Diagnosis-Related Group Name  Traditional  Managed Care  Total 
Permanent cardiac pacemaker implant 
w/ acute myocardial infarction, heart 
failure, or shock 
Pleural effusion w/  cc 
Pleural effusion w/o cc 
Pneumothorax w/  cc 
Poisoning & toxic effects of drugs age >17 
Poisoning & toxic effects of drugs age >  17 
Postoperative & post-traumatic infections 
Postpartum & post abortion diagnoses wlo 
Primary iris procedures 
Prostatic O.R. procedure unrelated to 
principal diagnosis 
Psychoses 
Pulmonary edema & respiratory failure 
Pulmonary embolism 
Radiotherapy 
Red blood cell disorders age >  17 
Renal failure 
Respiratory infections & inflammations age 
>17 w/  cc 
Respiratory infections & inflammations age 
>17 w/o cc 
Respiratory neoplasms 
Respiratory signs & symptoms w/ cc 
Respiratory signs & symptoms w/o cc 
Respiratory system diagnosis with 
Reticuloendothelial & immunity disorders 
Reticuloendothelial & immunity disorders 
Retinal procedures 
Seizure & headache age >  17 w/ cc 
Seizure & headache age >  17 w/o cc 
Septic arthritis 
Septicemia age >  17 
Signs & symptoms of musculoskeletal 
Signs & symptoms w/ cc 
Signs & symptoms wlo cc 
Simple pneumonia & pleurisy age >  17 




w/  cc 
w/o cc 





































































































(continued) Table 8.4  (continued) 
Diagnosis-Related Group Name  Traditional  Managed Care  Total 
Simple pneumonia & pleurisy age >  17 
wlo cc 
Skin graft &/or debridement for skin ulcer 
or cellulitis wl cc 
Skin graft &/or debridement for skin ulcer 
or cellulitis wlo cc 
Skin grafts &wound debridement for 
endocrine, nutritional, & metabolic 
disorders 
Skin ulcers 
Soft tissue procedures wl cc 
Soft tissue procedures wlo cc 
Specific cerebrovascular disorders except 
transient ischemic attack 
Spinal procedures 
Splenectomy age >  17 
Sprains, strains, & dislocations of hip, 
Stomach, esophageal, & duodenal 
Stomach, esophageal, & duodenal 
Subtotal mastectomy for malignancy wl cc 
Syncope & collapse wl cc 
Syncope & collapse wlo cc 
Tonsil and adenoid procedure, except 
pelvis, & thigh 
procedures age >  17 wl cc 
procedures age >  17 wlo cc 
tonsillectomy &lor  adenoidectomy only, 
age >I7 
Tendonitis, myositis, & bursitis 
Testes procedures, for malignancy 
Thyroid procedures 
Total mastectomy for malignancy wl cc 
Tracheostomy except for face, mouth, & 
Tracheostomy for face, mouth, & neck 
Transient ischemic attack & precerebral 
Transurethral procedures wl cc 
Transurethral prostatectomy wl cc 
Trauma to the skin, subcutaneous tissue, 
&breast age >I7 wl cc 
Trauma to the skin, subcutaneous tissue, 
& breast age >  17 wlo cc 
Trauma injury age >  17 wl cc 
Traumatic injury age >17 wlo cc 
Traumatic stupor & coma, coma <  1 hr age 
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Table 8.4  (continued) 
Diagnosis-Related Group Name  Traditional  Managed Care  Total 
Uncomplicated peptic ulcer w/ cc 
Uncomplicated peptic ulcer w/o cc 
Upper limb & toe amputation for 
circulatory system disorders 
2  0  2 
3  2  5 
1  0  1 
Urinary stones wl cc, &/or  extracorporeal 
shock wave lithotripsy  6  4  10 
Urinary stones w/o cc  1  1  2 
malignancy wl cc  6  1  I 
ovariadadnexal malignancy wl cc  1  0  1 
Vagina, cervix, & vulva procedures  2  0  2 
Vaginal delivery wl complicating diagnoses  2  1  3 
Vaginal delivery wl sterilization &/or D&C  1  0  1 
Viral illness & fever of unknown origin age 
0-17  0  2  2 
Viral illness age >  17  32  10  42 
Viral meningitis  I5  8  23 
Wound debridement & skin graft except 
Uterine & adnexal procedure for non- 
Uterine, adnexal procedure for non- 
hand, for musculoskeletal & connective 
tissue disorder  12  2  14 
Wound debridements for injuries  4  1  5 
Note:  cc = Complicating conditions. 
DRGs occur only a few times over the period of somewhat more than a 
year even in such a large teaching hospital. In this respect, the sheer vol- 
ume of patients brought in by managed care may be its greatest contribu- 
tion to the teaching experience available for housestaff. This might be less 
of a contribution, however, if the managed care services are more likely to 
admit patients with very common diagnoses than are the traditional ser- 
vices, where more rare conditions might be more frequently admitted as 
“teaching” cases. Figure 8.1 plots the fraction of patients in DRGs of 
varying frequency who come from managed care services, and finds no 
support for that hypothesis. Because we have not compared the frequency 
of admissions for the DRGs in this institution to those occurring nation- 
wide, we cannot say that either service necessarily emphasizes common or 
rare diagnoses. Nevertheless, the managed care service does not seem to 
decrease the diversity of diagnoses. 
Another commonly discussed set of  hypotheses concerning managed 
care patients is that they are less ill on average-when admitted because 
they tend to be drawn from a healthier population than traditional pa- 
tients. This is consistent with the lower average DRG weight on the man- 
aged care service reported in table 8.3. Alternatively, others speculate that 266  David Meltzer, Frederick L. Hdtz, and David Bates 
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E  a 
DRG Frequency 
Fig. 8.1  Percentage of managed care patients by DRG frequency 
the managed care patients admitted with a given diagnosis may be more 
ill on average than the traditional patients because there is a higher thresh- 
old for admission to the hospital. One way to examine this is to look at 
admissions for individual DRGs with and without complicating condi- 
tions. Though we found a slightly higher percentage of managed care pa- 
tients in those DRGs without complications than we found in DRGs with 
complications (0.29 versus 0.23), this difference is not statistically different 
from zero. 
8.4  Differences in Costs 
This section examines the difference in costs on the traditional and man- 
aged care medical services. The data on costs are generated from a cost 
accounting  system that  imputes  costs  using cost-to-charge ratios.  For 
those patients for whom no actual detailed bill is generated (i.e., Medicare 
or capitated or per diem managed care), charges are assigned based on 
utilization in the same way they would be for a patient billed under tradi- 
tional insurance. 
Table 8.5 reports regressions that examine the effect of managed care 
on costs controlling for managed care status, age, sex, race, and DRG 
weight (WT95). Regression 1 suggests that costs are approximately $2,800 
lower per hospitalization for patients on the managed care service control- 
ling for these covariates. Regression 2 suggests one major reason for this 
reduction in costs-namely,  that length of stay is approximately 1.3 days 
shorter on the managed care service controlling for these same covariates. 
Regression 3 includes length of stay in the total cost regression. The par- 
tial effect of managed care now  becomes insignificantly different from 
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costs through a decrease in length of stay in this setting. Since the man- 
aged care organization compensates the hospital on a per diem rate, this 
is perhaps not surprising. 
The remaining regressions examine specific components of costs. Re- 
gressions 4 and 5 show a similar story for pharmacy costs as for total cost: 
a decrease for managed care patients that is eliminated after controlling 
for length of stay. Regressions 6 and 7 show a decrease in lab charges un- 
der managed care that is substantially reduced to only about $200 by con- 
trolling for length of stay. Regressions 8 and 9 show no effect of managed 
care on radiology costs without controlling for length of stay. After con- 
trolling for length of stay, radiology costs are about $200 higher on the 
managed care service. Not surprisingly, regressions 10 and 11 show a large 
effect of managed care on room charges that is eliminated by  controlling 
for length of stay. In fact, the difference reverses, with higher average costs 
for managed care controlling for length of stay, presumably because man- 
aged care patients spend a larger fraction of their days in intensive care 
for any length of stay for a diagnosis. This is consistent both with the 
incentives of the managed care organization, which pays a fixed rate per 
diem, and the MCO’s relative expertise in moving patients from a nonin- 
tensive hospital bed to home. 
Overall, the results of this section suggest that the managed care organi- 
zation in  this institution  accomplishes the  majority of  its cost saving 
through a decrease in length of stay. This suggests that examining the 
effects of incentives on mechanisms that affect length of stay may be par- 
ticularly fruitful. The following sections discuss a specific set of manage- 
ment decisions that have effects on length of stay. 
8.5  Effects of Workload on Length of Stay 
In previous work (Meltzer, Hiltz, and Bates 1997), we used discrete time 
logistic hazard models and Monte Carlo simulation to examine the effects 
of house officer workload on length of stay and found significant effects of 
workload on discharge probabilities over the hospital stay which differed 
between the traditional and managed care services. On both the tradi- 
tional  service and  the managed care  service, increased workload was 
found to decrease discharge probabilities during the first four days of  a 
hospitalization. This is consistent with congestion effects when housestaff 
are simply too busy to complete their work quickly enough to permit the 
most rapid possible discharge of patients. From days 5 through 8, there is 
no effect of workload on length of stay. After day 8, however, there is a 
positive effect of workload on discharge probabilities on the traditional 
service, but not the managed care service. This is consistent with a dump- 
ing effect in which busy house officers discharge patients who are not nec- 
essarily in acute need of hospitalization in order to decrease their work- Implications of Managed Care for Teaching Hospitals  269 
load. It is possible that this is not evident on the managed care service 
because the strong incentive for attendings to discharge on that service 
implies that all of the patients on that service who remain in the hospital 
are there because they absolutely cannot be safely discharged. 
On the traditional service, these two opposing effects of increased work- 
load net out to suggest a very small decrease in length of  stay with in- 
creased workload. On the managed care service, however, with a signifi- 
cant congestion effect and no dumping effect, the net effect of increased 
workload is to increase length of stay. Our estimates suggested an increase 
in costs of approximately $125,000 per year from a 20 percent decrease in 
housestaff, which would save less than $125,000 per year in salary. 
8.6  Differences in Staffing on  the Services 
These differing effects of workload on length of stay on the traditional 
and managed care services suggest that there might be greater benefits to 
higher staffing on the managed care service. The average daily workload 
on the two services reported in table 8.3 confirms that there is indeed 
higher staffing on the managed care service. It seems, then, that the hospi- 
tal is responding in some sense to the differing incentives with respect to 
housestaff workload on the two services. To  understand better how it is 
that the differing incentives for staffing on the two services may exist, it is 
useful to examine the effects of attending incentives in the two services on 
the optimal house officer staffing decision. 
To model the hospital’s house officer staffing decision, we  assume that 
hospitals choose staffing and attending salary to maximize profit (n)  sub- 
ject to: (1) attending discharge incentives and (2) attending participation 
constraints. 
In order to model attending discharge decisions, we  assume that at- 
tendings care about quality of care (Q)  and income (I),  where Q = Q(L,n), 
so quality depends on length of stay (L)  and staffing level (n),  where Q, 
> 0, Q, > 0. As described above, attending discharge incentives differ on 
the two services in that physician’s pay rises with lower resources utiliza- 
tion, and especially length of  stay on the managed care service. Thus, 
physician income can be modeled as I = I, - iL,  so  that income is  a 
baseline level I, minus an incentive, i, to decrease length of stay. 
Subject to these incentives, attendings choose L to maximize Q(L,n) + 
I, -  iL  so that: 
(1)  Q,(L,n) - i  =  0. 
This is the attending incentive compatibility constraint, and it describes 
how long an attending will choose to keep a patient in the hospital given 
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To compete for attendings, hospitals must offer attendings a compensa- 
tion package including quality of care and total income that is at least as 
good as the competitive level of utility for attendings at other hospitals 
(U,). Specifically, assume that attendings choose a hospital based on fi- 
nancial compensation and quality to maximize their utility: 
If this is the case, then hospitals must provide attendings a base compensa- 
tion (Z,)  of at least 
(2)  I,  =  U, - Q(L,n)  +  iL. 
This is the attending participation constraint. 
profit (II) 
Given  these  constraints,  hospitals  choose  staffing  (n) to maximize 
II  =  P(Q(L,n))  - (I, - iL) - kn - cL, 
where P(Q(L,n))  is the price received for care of  quality Q, Z,  - iL is 
total physician compensation, kn is the cost of staffing level n (k  per staff 
position), and cL is the cost per day of hospitalization, subject to the 
attending incentive compatibility (1) and participation (2) constraints. 
Substituting the participation constraint into the profit equation gener- 
ates the LaGrangian: 
L  =  P(Q(L,n))  + Q(L,n) - U, - kn - cL +  A[i - QL], 
which is then maximized over n, L, and A to yield: 
FOC  n: 
FOC L: 
[P,  +  l]Q, - k - A  x  QL, =  0, 
[P,  +  1]Q,  - c - A  x  Q,,  =  0, 
FOC  A:  Q,(L,n) - i  =  0. 
If [PQ  + 13  Q, -  c <  0 so that hospitals want to decrease length of stay at 
the margin and if  Q,,  < 0 so that there are diminishing returns to length 
of stay, then A > 0. If better staffing has a larger effect on quality when 
length of stay is shorter, so Q,  < 0, then [PQ  + 11  Q, -  k > 0, which 
implies that staffing (n) would be higher for any length of stay. 
To be strict in determining the effect of incentives on staffing, we  can 
totally differentiate and solve for 
the sign of  which will be the same as the sign of the term in brackets in 
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second-order conditions. The sign of this term cannot be determined in 
general, but if it is positive, optimal staffing would rise with attending 
discharge incentives. This will  be  the case if, as stated above, hospitals 
want to decrease length of stay at the margin, there are diminishing returns 
to length of  stay, and better staffing has a larger effect on quality when 
length of stay is shorter. 
8.7  Conclusion 
This paper presents some preliminary observations concerning the role 
and functioning of a managed care medicine service in a single teaching 
hospital. Although the results are clearly preliminary, the suggestion is 
that the managed care service is able to decrease resource utilization com- 
pared to the traditional service, and to do so largely by achieving reduc- 
tions in length of stay. It is possible that this is a peculiarity of the man- 
aged care service in this institution, particularly given the fact that it is 
rewarded for reductions in length of stay because it pays the hospital a 
per diem rate. However, the ease of monitoring length of  stay and high 
cost associated with staffing a hospital bed make it likely that reductions 
in length of stay are a common mechanism for reducing costs under other 
payment systems as well. 
With the ease of monitoring length of stay, it is interesting that the tradi- 
tional service has not adopted mechanisms to provide attendings more 
powerful incentives to cut length of stay. Indeed, more powerful incentives 
for attendings are beginning to find their way into academic medical ten- 
ters. For example, the desire to provide stronger incentives to control in- 
patient costs is probably an important reason for the strong interest in 
academic medical centers in shifting responsibility for inpatient care to 
“hospita1ists”-physicians  who specialize in inpatient care (Wachter and 
Goldman 1996). Because of their higher patient volume and greater re- 
sponsibility for inpatient care, these hospitalists can presumably be com- 
pensated more directly for their success in controlling costs and may be in 
a better position to control costs. 
In the absence of such innovative approaches, the lower staffing on the 
traditional service and the empirical and theoretical result that this lower 
staffing might be an alternative mechanism to encourage early discharge 
suggest that the teaching hospital may  implicitly employ other methods 
to control length of stay. Similarly, the presence of higher staffing on the 
managed care service is accompanied by other efforts to decrease length 
of stay, such as the use of nurse managers. The presence of these multiple 
incentive mechanisms and other means of controlling resource use within 
the institution suggest a potential difficulty in studying the effects of incen- 
tives on behavior within organizations as complex as teaching hospitals. 
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realities tempt teaching hospitals and regulators to experiment with new 
financial arrangements. 
As for the effects of  managed care on the educational objectives of 
teaching hospitals, this paper has even more limited ability to draw conclu- 
sions. In this institution, the managed care service appears to admit a 
substantial number of patients with diagnoses that vary significantly in 
severity of illness and frequency. This suggests that the managed care ser- 
vice is making a positive educational contribution. Moreover, the experi- 
ence of observing how physicians working under managed care are able 
to accelerate discharge may be a valuable lesson in its own right. While 
there may be truth in the frequently cited concern that with shorter lengths 
of stay, housestaff may not have as much opportunity to learn from their 
patients, examination of that hypothesis will require data on what hous- 
estaff learn from their training that we do not currently possess. In previ- 
ous work (Meltzer, Hiltz, and Bates 1997), we have found some evidence 
that managed care also takes some of the decision making out of  the 
hands of the housestaff, which may also compromise their educational 
experience. Examining this hypothesis will also require richer data than is 
currently available. 
Though the spread of managed care presents challenges to teaching 
hospitals, it is clear that they cannot remain financially viable unless they 
learn to work with managed care. This will be an important challenge in 
the years ahead. 
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Comment on Chapters 7  and 8  Laurence Baker 
The growth of managed care over the past two decades has brought many 
new  questions to the forefront of health policy research in the United 
States. Among the most fundamental is the effect that managed care has 
on the provision of medical care and, particularly, the quality of health 
care. Of course, managed care could influence health care provision and 
quality in a variety of ways. Perhaps the most important is through the 
financial incentives and central oversight imposed on providers, which can 
have strong impacts on the health care delivered to patients enrolled in 
managed care organizations. Patients and their advocates have long feared 
that financial incentives to treat less and the utilization of review processes 
that limit care would lead to the underprovision of quality in health care. 
As pressure from employers has grown and competition between plans 
has intensified, so have fears that managed care could compromise quality 
in pursuit of financial gain. 
These fears have generated a strong demand for information about the 
quality of care in managed care plans, to which the research community 
has responded by generating a large and steadily increasing body of work 
examining the health care provided to patients enrolled in managed care 
plans. But because of the complexity of these questions, much remains to 
be understood about the care provided by  managed care organizations. 
The papers by Sarah Feldman and David Scharfstein and by David Melt- 
zer, Frederick L. Hiltz, and David Bates explore two of the areas in need 
of further research. 
Questions about the quality of health care are at the forefront of many 
current health care policy discussions, but the available information about 
quality is far from complete. Even the concept of “quality” is difficult to 
define in practice. Beyond defining quality, the methodological hurdles to 
doing research on quality are formidable. The prototypical quality studies 
have compared patients with traditional indemnity insurance plans who 
receive (more or less) fee-for-service health care to managed care patients 
(Miller and Luft 1997). But these studies have suffered through imperfect 
measures of quality, data difficulties, and questions about the interpreta- 
tion of differences in those things that can be measured. 
Most attempts at quality measurement have tended to fall into three 
categories: measurement of health outcomes, analyses of the processes by 
which care is produced, and surveys of consumer satisfaction. Analyses of 
health outcomes, a common approach to studying quality in managed 
care plans, typically rely on large administrative databases like hospital 
discharge abstracts collected by  state regulators or databases containing 
Laurence Baker is assistant professor of health research and policy at Stanford University 
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insurance claim records. These databases provide information on some 
baseline characteristics of the patients and basic information about their 
medical condition and the treatments they received. It is often possible to 
link these data to mortality records or other databases to provide informa- 
tion about the outcome of their care. But administrative databases often 
provide only a limited set of outcomes for analysis, and the available out- 
comes are often relatively rare events, leading to difficulties with small 
samples; for many health problems, studying differences in mortality rates 
can be difficult. Moreover, using nonrandomized data to study outcomes 
forces investigators  to deal with variations in illness severity or health sta- 
tus across patients that can be difficult to observe. In many cases, sufficient 
data to fully control for severity differences across patients that influence 
their health outcomes as well  as, say,  their choice of insurance are not 
available, leaving results subject to substantial bias. 
Other studies examine processes of care, such as determining whether 
patients with diabetes received appropriate follow-up care and periodic 
retinal examinations and asking whether the processes of  care for man- 
aged care and non-managed  care patients are similar. These studies are 
also potentially interesting, but they tend to require burdensome data col- 
lections, making it difficult to conduct broadly based process studies. As 
a practical matter, process measures can only focus on a relatively small 
number of items, which also limits their applicability-knowledge  about 
vaccination rates for children may be of little use to an adult picking a 
health plan. The use of satisfaction surveys, while useful, captures infor- 
mation from the patient’s perspective. While this information is often of 
crucial importance to patients, it is not clear that it always reflects the 
actual health outcomes of interest. 
Against  a backdrop of  numerous helpful but  imperfect attempts to 
study quality, Feldman and Scharfstein’s focus on care volume offers a 
new perspective on quality measurement. The use of volume as a quality 
measure is based on the literature that reports a positive correlation be- 
tween the number of procedures performed by health care providers and 
the outcomes for patients (the so-called volume-outcome relationship). 
Volume has also been used by other groups as an indicator of quality. For 
example, various specialty groups, state governments, and other accredita- 
tion agencies have considered the implementation of  rules that would 
force providers offering some services to demonstrate that they have per- 
formed at least a minimum number of procedures per year, basing their 
argument on volume-outcome studies. 
Feldman and Scharfstein’s finding that there is wide variation in pro- 
vider volumes between health plans and generally strong differences be- 
tween managed care and fee-for-service plans signals the possibility of 
variations in the quality of care provided by  managed care plans and, 
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comes for managed care patients may not be as good as outcomes for fee- 
for-service patients. The results also highlight the fact that quality may 
vary from service to service within a plan, something that could signifi- 
cantly complicate broad assessments of quality across plans. For physician 
volume, Feldman and Scharfstein find that plan A has the highest volumes 
for breast cancer surgery and for gynecologic cancer surgery but is among 
the plans with the lowest volumes for colorectal cancer surgery. Con- 
versely, the surgeons used by plan F had the highest volumes for colorectal 
cancer surgery but were among the lowest for volume of breast and gyne- 
cologic cancer surgery. A goal of many quality-measurement  efforts is the 
construction of a small number of measures that can be used to character- 
ize quality across plans and can be made understandable to patients mak- 
ing complex choices across plans. But the large differences across plans 
suggests that a small set of indices may fail to capture important variations 
for individual procedures, or that the creation of a small set of indicators 
that are truly representative may be impossible. 
In highlighting the provocative differences in volume across plans and 
between managed care and traditional insurers, this work also prompts a 
series of  more  detailed  questions about  the  interpretation  of  volume 
differences and about the degree to which they could be more widely used 
as indicators of quality. First, additional attention to the shape of the rela- 
tionship between volume and outcomes would strength the interpretation 
of these results. While studies of the relationship between volume and out- 
comes suggest that increases in volume go with improvements in  out- 
comes, it is not clear that this relationship is linear. Many volume-outcome 
studies suggest that outcomes improve with volume over some range of 
volumes, but  that  once  sufficiently high  levels  of  volume  have  been 
reached, the benefits to additional increases in volume are limited. Feld- 
man and Scharfstein make the case that the volumes of providers seen by 
managed care patients are often lower than volumes of providers seen by 
traditionally insured patients, but we  must be  somewhat cautious in in- 
ferring that outcomes are worse; if we  are on a flat part of the volume- 
outcome curve, reductions in volume may have small or no impact on out- 
comes. 
Second, it would be interesting  to expand the analysis of the appropriate 
set of procedures to include when volumes are computed. In spirit, the 
question is, What makes a surgeon good at what she or he does? Is it the 
number of surgeries within a broad group of procedures that determine 
outcomes for a specific procedure? Or should we  count only the specific 
instances of surgeries exactly like the one in question? Similar questions 
could be asked at the hospital level, where the crucial question is the ability 
of the hospital to take good care of patients after surgery, which may or 
may not depend on the specific procedures done for the patients. 
A third set of questions begins with the mechanisms that drive the rela- 276  Comment on Chapters 7 and 8 
tionship between volume and outcomes. Do increases in volume bring 
about improvements in outcomes, say, through learning by doing? Or do 
higher volumes reflect the underlying skill or other attributes of provid- 
ers-that  is, do some surgeons have high volumes because they have good 
outcomes or other  attributes that  attract patients? In an environment 
where managed care plans can influence the volume of services performed 
by  physicians, the answers to these questions will have a strong bearing 
on the usefulness of volume measures, particularly over time. Suppose, for 
example, that an HMO were to send all of its gynecologic cancer surgery 
cases to a surgeon with initially low volumes for these procedures, raising 
the volumes of the surgeon. If the initial low volume reflected an inherently 
lower level of skill, then the use of volume as an indicator of quality could 
be inaccurate. But if higher volumes created better outcomes, the measure 
would be better. 
While Feldman and Scharfstein’s work attempts to assess the quality of 
the providers seen by managed care patients, David Meltzer, Frederick L. 
Hiltz, and David Bates investigate the complex financial and other interac- 
tions between managed care organizations, physicians, and hospitals that 
also have a strong impact on the care received by  patients enrolled in 
managed care organizations. One of the central questions raised by  the 
growth of managed care is the impact of the new financial incentives (e.g., 
capitation) on the behavior of health care providers. In isolation, this ques- 
tion is not difficult; if physicians are paid more when they do less, they 
will  have an incentive to do less. But in reality, the health care delivery 
system is a complex organism in which health care for any given individual 
is produced through numerous interactions between a variety of agents, 
each of whom may have differing financial and other incentives influenc- 
ing his or her behavior. In this setting, gaining a full understanding of the 
impact of these incentives on the behavior of providers is not an easy 
task. Even the most straightforward HMO arrangements can impose a 
complicated set of incentives on interacting providers. It is not difficult, 
for example, to find HMOs that contract with groups of physicians using 
incentives to limit hospitalizations.  The groups, in turn, often pay member 
physicians using salaries, so the incentives are not effectively passed on to 
the individual physicians. The same HMO may also have contracts with 
hospitals in which payment is based on the number of patient days, so that 
under some circumstances,  the financial incentives would lead the hospital 
administrators to prefer to keep a patient in the hospital an extra day, 
while the physician group would rather discharge the patient, and the indi- 
vidual physician would find himself or herself more or less indifferent. 
Things only get more complex in teaching hospitals, where hospitals, at- 
tending physicians, and interns and residents may all have varying incen- 
tives. These difficulties  may be among the reasons that many previous in- 
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care, choosing to leave the lid on the black box that conceals the actual 
interaction of the incentives within the hospital. 
Meltzer, Hiltz, and Bates lift the lid and allow us a glimpse inside. In 
explicitly describing the various levels of incentives and providing empiri- 
cal evidence about the effects of managed care on the operation of a teach- 
ing hospital, this paper provides very valuable information that should 
fuel further work on these important questions. While we  know that the 
overall effect of managed care is to reduce hospital utilization, we  now 
find out some more about the complex interactions that generate this 
outcome. Their finding that the incentives of  the managed care plans 
on attending physicians do have a strong influence on care provided in a 
teaching hospital is further indication of the power of managed care or- 
ganizations in dictating the care that will be provided to their members. 
In the end, both of these papers provide important evidence that both 
helps us understand the effects of managed care on the health care system 
and highlights the need for further work on these questions. 
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Comment on Chapters 7 and 8  Alan Weil 
The paper by  Feldman and Scharfstein offers insight into an important 
and timely topic-how  the growing reliance on managed care in the health 
care system  may affect the quality of services people receive. The paper cites 
but does not discuss in detail the literature showing that higher-volume 
providers, both hospitals and physicians, tend to offer higher-quality care. 
The paper provides a quantitative analysis, using Massachusetts hospital 
discharge data, of the extent to which managed care organizations direct 
patients to higher- or lower-volume providers than  patients in  fee-for- 
service (FFS) plans select. 
The findings are varied. For two of the three surgical procedures exam- 
ined, after controlling for factors such as patient age, location, race, and 
income that might affect patients’ choice of providers, patients enrolled 
in private managed care plans are found to receive services from lower- 
volume physician providers. For Medicare patients, managed care plans 
use higher-volume physicians than Medicare FFS patients for two of the 
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services, but much lower-volume physicians for the third. For all three 
procedures, private FFS patients tend to use higher-volume hospitals than 
patients in managed care plans. The comparison yields mixed results when 
looking at Medicare. 
An important additional finding is that volume varies across managed 
care plans. The variation is limited when analyzing physician services. But 
when looking at hospital services, the variation is pronounced. Patients in 
one of the six health plans separately reported receive their services from 
high-volume hospitals at a far higher rate than that of any other plan or 
patients enrolled in fee-for-service plans. 
These findings raise two sets of questions. First, How should we  inter- 
pret the results that show a relationship between care delivery system and 
provider volume? Second, How do these findings help us understand the 
quality of care in different systems? 
Given the varied results across plans, procedures, and payment sources, 
a finding of a relationship between delivery system and provider volume 
is difficult to interpret without a model of behavior by those systems that 
would  suggest why  volume might differ and vary across these parame- 
ters. One theory offered by the authors is that lower-volume hospitals are 
more likely to be community hospitals, which are lower cost. Price-sensi- 
tive managed care plans would rather contract with lower-cost providers, 
which results in a lower-volume network. This hypothesis prompts the 
reader to wonder what explains the other sources of variation in volume. 
Do Medicare plans face different incentives than private plans? Do plans 
use different contracting approaches for physicians than they do for hospi- 
tals? Do plans use different approaches for different sorts of physicians? 
Only when these issues are examined will it be possible to interpret the 
paper’s finding that volume ratios differ by payer, provider, and procedure. 
In addition, it is not clear that plans contract primarily or exclusively 
on the basis of price. Plans must amass a provider network that satisfies 
geographical and practice-breadth objectives. Plans may seek to build re- 
lationships with provider networks that rely on that plan for a large por- 
tion of their volume, thereby allowing the plan to have a greater say in the 
providers’ actions. Provider arrangements may reflect historical alliances 
in a community more than they reflect an economic transaction on the 
basis of price. 
The paper also examines variations in provider volume as a basis for 
understanding more about plan quality. This step in the analysis must be 
taken with great caution. The paper presents information that suggests an 
interesting hypothesis about health plan markets that the authors briefly 
explore. The data showing one plan with heavy reliance upon high-volume 
hospitals while other plans use lower-volume hospitals raises the possibil- 
ity that the managed care market is segmented into high-quality and low- 
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in savings as compared to fee for service, but who are willing to pay ex- 
tra to retain a higher-cost and presumably higher-quality network. Low- 
quality plans compete for enrollees who are primarily interested in price 
and are less concerned or less willing or able to pay for a higher-quality 
network. If this market segmentation exists, comparing aggregate HMO 
and fee-for-service volumes does not yield valuable information. In this 
model, HMOs do not affect quality. Rather, they pick a level of quality and 
market and price themselves within a segment of the health plan market. 
In this regard, it is worth considering the possibility that product identi- 
fication operates in the same manner for HMOs as it does for hospitals. 
Utilization patterns in fee-for-service plans are driven entirely by choices 
made by  individual enrollees. The plan is simply a payment mechanism. 
An alternative way  of formulating the question asked by  the authors is: 
What actions are taken by HMOs in their selection of providers that leads 
them to select lower-volume providers than individuals do when left to 
their own choice? If fee-for-service patients tend to select higher-volume 
providers solely on the basis of name recognition or brand identification, 
HMOs that select providers on any other basis, even random choice, will 
tend toward lower-volume providers. Again, in this scenario, quality and 
volume differences between types of delivery systems are artifacts of other 
market factors that cannot be ascribed to actions taken by the plans. 
Even  after  exploring these issues, it is  worth  asking what  decision- 
making model for managed care plans selecting providers would cause 
one to believe that quality should vary plan by plan. While higher-volume 
providers may, in general, provide higher-quality care, and certain types 
of plans may rely on higher-volume providers, the conclusion that certain 
types of health plans are higher quality is only valid if there is some theory 
of plan behavior that suggests those plans seek higher-quality providers. 
One possible way out of this analytical challenge is to posit that plans care 
about quality, but believing that they cannot measure it directly, they seek 
to use volume as a proxy, much as the authors have done. This is a plaus- 
ible approach, but again, it can only be  understood in the context of  a 
description of actual plan behavior, not through analysis of hospital re- 
cords of patients. The authors do not explore this question directly-an 
undertaking that would require investigating the provider-selection crite- 
ria for the plans. 
While not the focus of the paper, the specification of the relationship 
between  volume  and  quality  seems  important.  Particularly,  knowing 
whether there is  a linear relationship between volume and quality or a 
threshold level  of  volume necessary before quality is  likely  to be  high 
would help interpret the results. This topic is of particular importance as 
it applies to this paper because the authors note the skewed distribution 
of volume across providers. The vast majority of providers operate at very 
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values of volume by  plan type, even when adjusted for patient factors, is 
meaningful if one assumes a linear relationship. If the relationship is more 
complex, a different comparison would be appropriate. 
In sum, the paper begins to analyze a very complex and important sub- 
ject. Any single analysis can only address one part of the complex relation- 
ship among plan type, provider volume, and quality of care. This paper 
offers information in one area that, in combination with a better under- 
standing of the structure and dynamics of plan contracting behavior and 
the nature of the health plan market, helps us understand this relationship. 
The Meltzer, Hiltz, and Bates paper examines utilization patterns inside 
a teaching hospital, comparing the practices of teams that serve a fee-for- 
service population with teams that serve managed care patients. The paper 
provides very valuable insight into how financial incentives and organiza- 
tional design can affect the practice of medicine. 
The setting examined in the paper offers almost ideal circumstances 
for an experimental design. Each of six practice services within the same 
hospital operates in largely the same way. In general, the attending physi- 
cian who directs patient care is employed by the hospital. However, in the 
two services that serve the bulk of managed care patients, care is directed 
for managed care patients by attending physicians affiliated with the man- 
aged care organization. The authors show that the financial incentives dif- 
fer for managed-care-oriented teams in very specific ways. They also show 
that  physicians from the  managed care plans receive  feedback on the 
length of stay of their patients, while no similar feedback occurs for the 
housestaff. 
The paper reaches a simple and strong conclusion. Managed care pa- 
tients have lower costs in this hospital setting, and those lower costs are 
essentially entirely due to shorter lengths of stay. Since the analysis fits the 
behavioral model nicely, the clear implication is that financial incentives 
can and do affect physician behavior. 
The paper creates an excellent foundation for additional analysis that 
could shed light on the behavioral effects of incentives. It would be  in- 
teresting to know if  similar behavioral results could be achieved for the 
hospital-based care managers if they were given feedback on the lengths of 
stay relative to those in the HMO-based team. That is, could information 
without a financial incentive affect behavior? 
It would also be interesting to test the behavioral hypothesis in other 
areas where financial arrangements are relevant. Similar financial incen- 
tives have been established for primary care physicians in their decisions 
to refer patients to specialists. When referral patterns are compared across 
physicians with varying incentives, are behavioral differences found? The 
authors note the reputation  that both  the health plan and the hospital 
have for high quality. If quality were less of a behavioral constraint, would 
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constraints that could be designed to assure that quality does not suffer 
when there are incentives to control utilization? 
An interesting comparison point would be the hospital’s actions with 
respect to its Medicare patients, where payments are made on the basis of 
diagnosis-related groups (DRGs), which create incentives for the hospital 
similar to those the HMO faces. According to the authors, the hospital 
does not translate this institutional incentive into an individual or team 
incentive for the physicians treating Medicare patients. Are there insti- 
tutions where efforts have been made to do so? Have these efforts had a 
similar effect on lengths of stay? Are there institutional reasons for avoid- 
ing approaches such as this in-house? 
The authors also examine how these incentives and practice models 
affect the educational mission of the institution. This is a complex matter. 
If patients can be treated effectively and with high quality using a shorter, 
more intensive hospital stay, then perhaps that is the care model physi- 
cians should be educated to pursue. The appropriate pedagogical response 
may  be to determine how care can most effectively be organized during 
that limited stay and how systems can be developed to meet the needs of 
the patient before admission and after discharge. This is not to deny the 
relevance of changed inpatient models on education. It is  simply to say 
that the sense of  lost opportunity from a traditional training perspective 
should be balanced against the opportunity to reexamine what physicians 
need to know to provide the best quality of care. 
The authors close with a note that teaching hospitals can only survive 
in the current health care market if they learn to work with managed care. 
The impression one gains from this analysis is that at least one such hospi- 
tal has taken an approach that shifts the behavior of the institution to 
conform to the changing financial incentives in the health care system. 
The paper provides those concerned about the future of teaching hospitals 
with excellent information that will  be useful in navigating and under- 
standing these changes. This Page Intentionally Left Blank